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ISSUES FACING WEAPONS SYSTEMS CONTRACTORS DEPLOYED IN SUPPORT OF CONTINGENCY OPERATIONS
During the fall of 2002, the program executive office command control communications tactical (PEO C3T) was tasked to develop, and subsequently field to and train us forces on a common Command and Control (C2) software baseline. This common system would serve as the source for C2 interoperability during the liberation of Iraq. This requirement arose from the vast number of disparate C2 products that existed throughout the army. Without a common system for interoperability, there would be no means for us forces to interoperate among themselves or their coalition partners. In response to this requirement, the PEO C3T created an internal ad hoc organization, the Special Projects Office (SPO). The primary mission of the SPO was to conduct site surveys of all deploying organizations to determine their current C2
capability. Following the site surveys, the SPO would then synchronize the efforts of the Army Battle Command Systems (ABCS) community to develop a common software baseline for use by all deploying units. The SPO was composed of select individuals from within PEO C3T, with each assigned a specific focus area based on their area of expertise. As C2 mission threads were identified and software enhancements were completed and tested, the requirement for fielding, training, and sustaining moved to the forefront. In support of this endeavor, the PEO C3T identified for deployment over 300 contractor support personnel. Their mission would be to provide readily available C2 system support to the combat commanders deployed in the Area of Responsibility (AOR). These support personnel represented over 23 programs/products and over 30-associated support contracts. Further, a vast majority of the technicians were specialized in only one or two of the 11 ABCS systems, which contributed to large number of personnel deployed. The daunting task of deploying such a large number of support personnel was one that had never previously been attempted within the Army Acquisition community. This paper will examine published joint and army guidance and chronicle the associated issues regarding the deployment of contractors. It will also provide a detailed account on the mitigating strategies employed by PEO C3T and offer recommendations for future policy enhancements and process improvement.
BACKGROUND
The use of contractors in support of U.S. military actions is a significant factor in the way we fight the nation's wars and engage in peacekeeping operations throughout the world.
Throughout the history of the U.S. Army, contractors have played a role in military operations.
Beginning with the Continental Army of George Washington, contractors were used to provide a variety of support services, thereby allowing the soldiers to focus their efforts on the conflict. 1 Over time the number of contractors supporting the force has steadily increased from a ratio of guidance to establish a consistent policy across the services. At best, the Joint Staff has provided only general guidance for regional commanders. 6 As a result, there is confusion and misunderstanding at lower levels on how to incorporate contractor personnel into military operations and units. Further, there is no standard contract language, within the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR), to serve as a baseline regarding the deployment of contractors. 7 The deployment of contractors, however, brings with it a number of risks and issues, which must be addressed. Many of these are centered on life support and force protection but all are highly dependent on the supported military unit. contractor-employee accountability policies. The burden for accomplishing contractor accountability is placed with the G-1 and must be conducted similarly to those procedures used to account for military and government civilian personnel. 17 This requirement makes only a recommendation that the Tactical Personnel System (TPS) be used to capture appropriate personnel data on deployed contractors. Furthermore, it offers only guidance on suggested data to collect. 18 As a result, accountability of contractor personnel varies by organization and includes anything on the spectrum from a simple head count to a detailed listing of personnel data. More definitive policy is required to ensure uniform accountability, of contractor personnel, throughout the Army. In a planned revision to AR 715-9, Contractors Accompanying the Force, the civilian tracking system (CIVTRACKS) is designated as the system for tracking accountability of deployed contractor personnel. However, while this system represents a step in the right direction, there is no clear designation of responsibility for entering contractor data. 19 Further, CIVTRACKS is designed for use with Department of Defense (DoD) civilians and may not provide the level of granularity needed for accountability of non-DoD personnel.
At PEO C3T it was determined that the number of shortfalls within CIVTRACKS were such that the organization could not accurately account for all deployed contractor personnel.
While PEO C3T implemented CIVTRACKS as an interim measure for capturing contractor data, another system was developed by the SPO to capture additional data. This system, know as SPO Tracker, was designed to provide accountability and visibility of the deployment status of all PEO personnel (military, civilian, and contractor). Some of the information captured by this tool included personal data, Soldier Readiness Processing (SRP) status, CRC dates, Program/Product supported, unit to be supported in the AOR, arrival date in AOR, and AOR sponsor. 20 The end result was a much more comprehensive picture of the deployment status, whereabouts, and contact information for PEO personnel throughout the deployment process. Despite their best efforts, on a regular basis, contractors arrived in the AOR unannounced not only to the SPO FWD cell, but also to the supported unit. Often these personnel arrived without any prior coordination, training, or protective equipment (e.g. NBC gear or body armor).
Further, many would attempt to embed themselves into an organization or remove themselves with no prior coordination or planning. As a result, countless resources were expended trying to resolve contractor visibility issues in the AOR. Some contractors were successfully incorporated into the unit level Army Materiel Command Logistics Support Element (AMC LSE)
teams, but since no prior agreements were in place, such efforts had mixed results. SPO Tracker was eventually successful at providing better visibility and management oversight of contractors as they entered and departed the AOR.
In recent DoD policy, accountability and visibility of defense contractor personnel are addressed in detail. This process will be accomplished through the use of a joint database, The local commander can direct a subordinate organization to provide administrative accountability of supporting contractor personnel. Further, if contractor employees become a liability to the local commander, he has the authority to direct their removal from the area of operations. 42 In the event that this becomes necessary, the contractor's organization is often required to provide an alternate individual to accomplish the mission, or face penalties for default.
The PEO C3T liaison officers, collocated with each headquarters element, assisted the supported commander by providing some level of daily supervision for the embedded support personnel. In a few isolated instances, the liaison officer directed the removal of contractor personnel who were no longer willing to perform their mission. The embedded liaison officers were essential to the swift removal and replacement of any ineffective support contractors.
FORCE PROTECTION
With the exception of self-defense, contractors are restricted from participating in force protection activities. 43 Joint Pub 4-0 places force protection responsibility with the contractor, unless contract agreements indicate otherwise. 44 However, Army policy contradicts this policy by mandating that the supported commander provide force protection for deployed contractors. 45 This protection includes the use of military forces to provide armed escort or security as well as providing contractor employees the appropriate training and self-protection equipment needed to survive in an NBC environment. 46 The combatant commander must therefore plan for and dedicate the appropriate combat forces to meet the force protection needs of his contractor personnel. These activities can detract from mission requirements and require additional planning and coordination to execute. Despite even the best efforts to protect them, the commander cannot force a contractor to remain in a hostile environment if they choose to leave. 47 The impact of such a decision is the added burden to the unit, which must inevitably place soldier's lives at risk to remove a contractor from the hostile area.
Force protection was and remains the single most concern of contractors deployed in support of PEO C3T efforts. Common sense and careful adherence to supported unit force protection plans have resulted in no fatalities among PEO C3T contractors and only a handful of minor injuries resulting from the collateral effects of Iraqi insurgent attacks. In new draft policy, the requirement for force protection of contractor personnel falls on the geographic Combatant
Commander. An exception to this requirement consists of those contracts, which have terminology placing the burden with another entity, and are approved by the geographic Combatant Commander.
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RECOMMENDATIONS
The ever-increasing reliance of contractors generates significant cost, legal considerations, and impact's the military mission. 49 53 Recommend that this document be adopted as the single source for DoD policy guidance and be subsequently refined as additional contractor issues arise.
A logical choice regarding contractors on the battlefield is to make every effort to reduce the number without significantly impacting the mission of the Combatant Commander.
Definitive policy is needed to address the incorporation of contractors into combat forces, the roles and responsibilities at the unit level, and planning considerations. 
CONCLUSION
Contractors will continue to supplement military activities. Definitive guidance and policy is needed to clarify not only the authorized locations for contractors on the battlefield but also the processes necessary for deploying and sustaining these personnel in the area of operations.
The adoption of SPO Tracker as the standard DoD accountability tool will serve as a means of integrating contractors into the force flow by providing the visibility and management ability of these vital assets at all levels. Further, enhancing the relationship between the acquisition community and AMC can only result in the synergy needed to better integrate the contractor capabilities into the total support package for the warfighter.
Despite their role to augment the force, it is naïve to believe that integrating contractors can be accomplished with minimal impact to the combatant commander and the mission.
Contractors are a force multiplier and play an essential role in achieving our National Military Strategy. They provide a level of expertise and flexible service that cannot be found within organic military forces. Their augmenting role is one that has a history as long as that of our armed forces. Policy reform and careful planning will allow contractors to continue their support to the U.S. military in current and future operations.
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